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ABSTRACT
Playing Hide-and-Seek with Spammers: Detecting Evasive
Adversaries in the Online Social Network Domain. (August 2012)
Robert Chandler Harkreader, B.S., Texas A&M University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Guofei Gu
Online Social Networks (OSNs) have seen an enormous boost in popularity
in recent years. Along with this popularity has come tribulations such as privacy
concerns, spam, phishing and malware. Many recent works have focused on
automatically detecting these unwanted behaviors in OSNs so that they may
be removed. These works have developed state-of-the-art detection schemes
that use machine learning techniques to automatically classify OSN accounts
as spam or non-spam. In this work, these detection schemes are recreated
and tested on new data. Through this analysis, it is clear that spammers are
beginning to evade even these detectors. The evasion tactics used by spammers
are identified and analyzed. Then a new detection scheme is built upon the
previous ones that is robust against these evasion tactics. Next, the difficulty
of evasion of the existing detectors and the new detector are formalized and
compared. This work builds a foundation for future researchers to build on so
that those who would like to protect innocent internet users from spam and
malicious content can overcome the advances of those that would prey on these
users for a meager dollar.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Online social networking sites (OSNs) are websites in which users can cre-
ate profiles, establish connections with friends and traverse these connections[1].
OSNs have existed since the creation of sixdegrees.com in 1997. Since then, hun-
dreds of OSNs have been created for a variety of purposes. OSNs did not become
mainstream until the creation of websites such as MySpace, LinkedIn, Facebook
and Twitter. Facebook is the largest of the mainstream OSNs, boasting over
500 million users [2]. The popularity of these websites has thrust online social
networking into the spot light. This has attracted news media, celebrities and
unfortunately, spammers. A paradigm example of the extraordinary role that
OSNs play in our society was when OSNs such as Facebook and Twitter played
critical roles in setting up protests in Cairo, Egypt in 2011 [3].
The battle to protect OSNs from spam has waged for several years now. In
August of 2009, nearly 11 percent of all Twitter posts were spam [4]. Annoying
advertisements are not the only concern for users on OSNs. Spammers have
also used this new platform for spreading malware, luring users to phishing
websites and even hosting botnet command and control channels [5]. There
have also been several reports of attacks on Twitter. The infamous Acai Berry
attack forced users to post an advertisement to all of their followers about the
supposed health benefits of Acai berries[6]. Koobface is a worm that propgates
This thesis follows the style of IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data
Engineering.
2itself through several different OSNs [7]. This worm was first detected in 2008,
but was easily thwarted by updates to the OSNs. Now a more evolved version
is propagating itself through OSNs once again [8]. Spam has a direct affect on
the OSN company itself because it costs money to store and maintain all of
these spam accounts and posts. In the bigger picture, when these spam attacks
steal identities from the members of society they not only cost those families
and credit card agencies thousands of dollars but also cause people to feel less
secure on the Internet [9]. These feelings of insecurity make people feel uneasy
about shopping online, which costs all online businesses money.
Due to these threats, many OSNs and even several research labs have put
effort into stopping this behavior. For instance, Twitter has published a set
of rules that users must abide by, called The Twitter Rules [10]. These rules
define behaviors that could cause an account to be considered as a spam account.
As defined by The Twitter Rules, spam-like behavior includes following many
accounts without having many users follow your account. This is known as
having a high following-follower ratio. Another spam-like behavior posting
duplicate tweets. If Twitter deems an account to be a spam account, the account
will be suspended from Twitter. Twitter also has a method for users to report
other accounts as spam, however, this relies on action from the average Twitter
user. In academia, works such as [11], [12], [13], [14] and [15] focus on
using supervised learning techniques to classify spam accounts from non-spam
accounts.
These methods have classified spammers with high accuracy with low num-
bers of false positives. Twitter has been able to greatly reduce the amount of
3spam on its website. However, as we will show, there is still quite a bit of spam
on Twitter. The reason for this is the adaptability of spammers. Many spam-
mers have already adapted to these techniques and have been able to evade
them. For instance, many websites have been set-up for the sole purpose of
purchasing followers on Twitter. This is a direct evasion of the rule from The
Twitter Rules which says you should not have a high following-follower ratio
[16]. There are also tools available to help you modify your tweets without
changing the meaning [17]. These evasive tactics require a response from the
research community to design more robust schemes that are more difficult to
evade than existing works.
This work performs an in-depth analysis of these advanced spammers, re-
ferred to as evasive spammers. First this work reproduces existing detection
schemes and evaluates them on data containing evasive spammers. Next, an
extensive analysis is performed on the evasive spammers to determine how they
are able to evade these detection schemes. Based on this analysis, a similar, yet
more robust detection scheme is proposed that is able to detect spammers that
successfully evaded previous work. Additionally, we quantify the robustness of
each feature of our detection scheme as well as the features of previous detection
schemes.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Three state-of-the-art detection schemes are reproduced and analyzed us-
ing a new data set.
• Evasive spammers are discovered and an in-depth analysis of their behav-
ior is performed.
4• A similar, but more robust, detection scheme is designed and imple-
mented. This detection scheme is able to correctly classify 13% more
spammers than the best existing detector while maintaining the same
false positive rate.
• The robustness of each detection scheme is analyzed and quantified.
5CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
As OSNs have become more popular in the world, many researchers have turned
their attentions to the study of these online communities. Kwa et al. [18] has
performed a study of the behavior of accounts on Twitter. This includes a
comprehensive and quantitative study of the distributions of various statistics
such as number of followers, number of followings as well as reciprocity between
accounts. Cha et al. [11] performed an in-depth measurement study of the
accounts on Twitter.
Since spam is such a real concern for many companies in many industries,
the goal of spam reduction is a hot topic. OSNs such as Twitter have directly
attacked spam by publicizing defining characteristics of spammers in The Twit-
ter Rules [10] as well as the creation of the Spammer Reporting tool [19]. Third
party vendors have also created applications in order to thwart the onslaught
of spam on Twitter. Blocky has created a blacklist of Twitter accounts based
on votes from Twitter users [20]. Tweet Blocker attempts to assign a score to
each Twitter account based on basic information such as registration time and
following-follower ratio. This helps other Twitter users know how credible a
Twitter account is before following them.
There are also several research publications about spam in OSNs. Koutrika
et al. [21] proposed a technique to detect tag spam in tagging systems. This
spam would direct users searching for material on a particular topic to spam
instead. They rank the credibility of a tag based on a tagger’s reliability, which
prevents spammers from performing this attack. Benevenuto et al. [22, 23] uses
6a supervised learning technique to classify videos posted by spammers from
normal videos on YouTube. Gao et al. [24] identifies and studies campaigns on
OSNs, identified based on the spam URLs that they post.
Even more related to this work, there have been several publications about
detecting spammers in OSNs, including Twitter. Several works use supervised
learning techniques to classify spammers from normal users on OSNs [12], [13],
[14], [15]. These works first create training data by labeling a set of known spam
accounts and a set of known non-spam accounts. Next they extract features
from these accounts that will help the algorithm distinguish between normal
and spam accounts. Lee et al. deployed social honeypot accounts in MySpace
as well as Twitter to collect spam accounts. They then used features such as
URLs per post, replies per post and number of connections to classify accounts.
Benevenuto et al. also used supervised learning techniques to detect spammers
on Twitter with features such as tweet contents, number of hashtags per post
and number of followings and followers. Wang [14] used unique features such as
a novel reputation score and number of duplicate Tweets as well as similar fea-
tures. These works all create an extensive examination of the use of supervised
learning in detection of spammers on OSNs using basic features.
This work recreates the best performing of these previous works and eval-
uates them on a new data set, with a different type of OSN spammer. The
analysis presented about these previous works shows that they are vulnerable
to evasion tactics that are already being used in the wild. This work performs
an in-depth analysis of these tactics in order to develop new, more robust fea-
tures that are able to detect these evasive spammers. Also, this work presents
7a quantitative study of the robustness of spam detection features. Thus, this
work adds value to the research community and proposes a new area of concern:
the evasive spammer.
8CHAPTER III
OVERVIEW
This chapter will describe the experimental domain, Twitter, and formally de-
fine key components of the problem. Then this chapter will formalize the prob-
lem statement.
A. Description of Twitter
Twitter is the fastest growing OSN on the Internet today. There are already
over 200 million users and many more are joining each day [25]. Twitter is
a micro-blogging website. A blog is a weblog which is a post hosted on the
Internet, accessible to others. Typically these weblogs can be as long or as
short as the author would like them to be. A micro-blog, however, limits the
number of characters the author can write in one blog post. In the case of
Twitter, authors can only post 140 characters at a time. This restriction, while
seemingly a hindrance to say what you really want to say, in fact produces an
interesting result. Since authors are forced to be more concise, they tend to
post more often and it doesn’t take much reading to understand their point.
This in-turn creates a real-time stream of the thoughts and feelings of the entire
world, pouring out for everyone to see. In a sense, it is like the pulse of the
world at any Twitter user’s fingertips.
However, it is impossible to read every single post, so one must make use
of the features provided by Twitter in order to sort out the madness. One way
to do so is to choose a select group of people that you would like to hear from.
9These may be your friends, co-workers, favorite celebrities or even your favorite
researchers. In order to do this, you search for their account on Twitter and
then click the button to follow them. Once you click this button, you are able
to see all of the posts of the users you follow each time you log in to Twitter.
Also, when one Twitter user follows another, the user being followed receives
an e-mail alert telling him that he has been followed, including a link to the
follower’s Twitter page.
Since Twitter is an OSN, there is a social aspect to it as well. If you
would like to communicate with someone, there are two options. The first is
the mention. By placing a token in your Tweet with the ‘@’ symbol, followed
by the screen name of another user on Twitter, one can mention another user
in their Tweet. When one user mentions another, the user being mentioned
can see this Tweet from their account even if the user is not following the user
that mentioned him. This means that the mentioned user will be notified of
the Tweet of the user that mentioned him, without giving any consent in the
matter.
Another interesting aspect of Twitter is the ability to see the opinions of
other Twitter users on a particular topic or current event. Trending topics can
assist a Twitter user in this endeavor. Trending topics are the recent most
frequently tweeted phrases. This could be a celebrities name, such as “Justin
Bieber” or a current event such as “Japanese earthquake”. Twitter automati-
cally extracts these trending topics from their public timeline. Twitter provides
a list of currently trending topics as links once a user logs in to the website.
A user can click the “Justin Bieber” link to see what thousands of people are
10
thinking about Justin Bieber right this second. Also, hashtags are used for a
similar purpose. A hashtag is a token in the post that begins with the ‘#’
symbol. If a user on Twitter searches for a hashtag, he can see all the cur-
rently posted Tweets containing these hashtags. This method is used for less
popular events, for example a small event happening on campus or a popular
event, such as a Starcraft 2 e-sports event that is not quite popular enough to
create a trending topic. These techniques are important to understand because
spammers use this to their advantage.
B. Definition of a Spammer
Most people that have used the Internet have encountered spam of some kind,
whether it be e-mail spam, forum spam, instant messenger spam or other types.
In this chapter, a formal definition of OSN spam is given with regards to this
work. Also, the motivations and typical behaviors of OSN spam are described.
Since this work focuses on the detection of spam in OSNs, particularly
Twitter, The Twitter Rules are consulted to assist with formalizing the defi-
nition of a spammer. In The Twitter Rules, spam and abusive behavior are
defined together in one category. This makes sense, because most abusers use
spam as a method for increasing the number of users they can deceive. The
Twitter Rules has many identifying behaviors for spammers. This work focuses
on those accounts that “publish or link to malicious content intended to dam-
age or disrupt another users browser or computer or to compromise a users
privacy” as well as those that “use the Twitter service for the purpose of spam-
ming anyone”[10]. Since spamming is a loosely defined term, Twitter states
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that the behaviors considered to be spamming behaviors will evolve over time
as spammers develop new techniques. In this work, we define a spammer to
be a Twitter account that publicizes links to malicious content with intent to
harm another user or publicizes spam with the intent to force unsolicited adver-
tisements upon another user. Admittedly, this definition relies upon knowing
the intentions of a particular Twitter user, which is difficult if not impossible
to know with certainty. For this reason, manual verification is required to be
confident of the correct classification of a particular Twitter account. The spe-
cific methodology for manual classification will be described in Chapter IV. If
a concrete definition of a spammer existed, detection would be trivial and this
work would not be interesting.
C. Motivation of Spammers
Regardless of the domain or behavior of a particular spammer, the motivation
is the same: to earn money. By spamming links to simple advertisements,
spammers can get paid for each user that clicks on the link. More devious
spammers may set up scams in order to trick na¨ıve users into giving them
their money for little or nothing in return. Other malicious spammers may use
Twitter as a catalyst for spreading existing malware and phishing campaigns.
By infecting users on Twitter with their malware, they can sell their computers
as bots in part of a botnet or steal and sell the user’s private information from
their computer. By directing Twitter users to phishing websites, they can steal
private information and sell this information on the black market.
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D. Typical Behavior of an OSN Spammer
In order to understand the behavior of OSN spammers, one must first under-
stand how to make money on OSNs. The previous section mentioned that
spammers will post links to websites with different nefarious goals. However,
the key to making money through these techniques is to deceive as many users
as possible into clicking these links.
Since OSNs are relatively new, the techniques of spammers are still rapidly
evolving. Despite the recentness of spam on OSNs, many spammers have devel-
oped cutting edge techniques in order to get more users to click their malicious
links. In order to get 10s of users to click a link, one must first expose this link
to 1,000s of users. On Twitter, each post an account makes is public to anyone
that can access Twitter. However, simply making the post available does not
mean that many people will see the post.
There are several methods that spammers use to get users to view their
posts. The most common is following. As mentioned before, when a user is
followed, they are alerted by Twitter about this event. The natural reaction is
to investigate this account to see if it is interesting and worth following back.
When a spam account follows a legitimate account, the legitimate account is
then exposed to the annoying and possibly harmful spam.
Other techniques take advantage of the Twitter specific features described
in Section A. The first of which is the mention. When a spammer mentions
a victim, that victim will see the mention and be exposed to that tweet. This
motivates the user to investigate the account that has mentioned them to see
what they had to say and if a reply may be needed. It may also encourage the
13
user to click any links in the post to see if the website they link to has any
content that would be interesting to the user.
Another common technique used by spammers to increase exposure to their
malicious links is to use trending topics and hashtags. Note that the previous
attack vectors were directed on individual accounts. By posting malicious URLs
in tweets containing trending topics or popular hashtags, the spammer is able to
expose anyone tracking these topics to their malicious content. However, with
this high reward potential also comes high risk, because polluting a trending
topic or popular hashtag may frustrate legitimate users and encourage them to
report the spam to Twitter.
E. Problem Statement
As mentioned before, spam causes headaches and financial loss. OSN spam
takes advantage of the trust that users put into OSNs. This work and related
works have focused on eliminating spam in OSNs. Specifically, the problem
that this thesis investigates is the detection of advanced spammers that have
evolved to avoid naive detection schemes.
In order to solve this problem, this work reproduces three state-of-the-
art detection schemes and analyzes their performance on a new data set. Next,
this work identifies evasive spammers and performs an in-depth analysis of their
evasive tactics. Then, a similar, but more robust, detection scheme is designed
and implemented. Finally, the robustness of each detection scheme is analyzed
and quantified.
14
CHAPTER IV
REPRODUCING CURRENT DETECTION SCHEMES
In this chapter, the current state-of-the-art detection schemes are reproduced
and tested with new data. This chapter describes the previous detection
schemes in-depth and also describes how the new data set was collected.
A. Description of Current Methods
This section describes the way that current detection schemes work.
1. The Machine Learning Technique
The state-of-the-art detection schemes use the machine learning technique. This
technique essentially “trains” a program to know the differences between a spam
account and a normal account. These programs must be trained on labeled data,
then they can be used to automatically classify unidentified accounts.
a. Feature Vector Representation
First, the machine learning program needs a way to comprehend these accounts.
To do this, features are extracted from each account to describe these accounts.
These features form a feature vector representation of each account. This makes
it possible for the program to learn what values of each feature are typical for
spam accounts and for normal accounts.
15
b. Labeled Data
In order to train the program and evaluate the detection scheme, known spam
accounts and known normal accounts are needed. These known spam and
normal accounts are used to train the program. Then, this program can be
used to automatically classify accounts. Also, part of the known spam and
normal accounts can be used to train the program and the rest can be used to
evaluate the trained program. This technique is known as cross-validation.
2. Features
This section describes some of the features that are used by the current detection
schemes. These features are divided into two categories: relational features and
content-based features.
a. Relational Features
One of the techniques that spammers use to gain attention, mentioned in Chap-
ter III, is following target accounts. As was mentioned, this behavior cre-
ates a high following-follower ratio. Thus, one of the relational features is the
following-follower ratio. The higher this ratio is, the more likely a user is to be
a spammer. However, there can be false positives, for example, when new legiti-
mate accounts join Twitter and follow some of their favorite celebrities with out
having many followers. For this reason, the number of followers and the number
of followings are also features. A slightly more robust relational feature is the
number of bidirectional connections an account has. This means the account
follows a user and that same user follows the account back. Spammers follow
16
many users and typically these users are uninterested in following these spam
accounts back. Thus, the fewer bidirectional connections an account has, the
more likely it is to be spam.
Another relational feature is the number of bi-directional links. A bi-
directional link occurs between two Twitter accounts when they follow each
other. This indicates that both parties are interested in each other and is a
stronger relationship. The number of bi-directional links an account has re-
flects the reciprocity between an account and the users that it follows. Since
Twitter spammers usually follow a large number of legitimate accounts and few
of them follow the spam accounts back, the reciprocity of the spammers is lower
than that of legitimate accounts. Thus, this feature has been used to detect
spammers by existing work.
b. Content Based Features
Also described in Chapter III, Twitter spammers almost always post URLs in
their spam tweets in order to direct a user to a website that will try to harm
or deceive the user. For this reason, the number of URLs posted per tweet
is a content based feature. Since spammers also abuse features available to
legitimate Twitter users such as the mention and the hashtag, described in
Section A. Thus, the number of hashtags and mentions per tweet have also
been used as content based features. Since the beginning of the battle between
spammers and anti-spammers, common spam terms have been used to identify
e-mails or forum posts that are spam. Previous works have also attempted
to use a list of known spam terms to combat spam on Twitter. Also, it is
17
beneficial for a spammer to post several tweets containing the same URL in
order to increase traffic to the website. For this reason, another content based
feature is the number of pairs of duplicate tweets. Since it is easy for a spammer
to slightly modify a tweet, some works have used a more robust version of this
feature, which is tweet similarity. This calculates the tweet similarity of all
tweets and assigns a score based on how similar the tweets are with each other.
The remaining features used by these existing techniques are enumerated
in Chapter VII. Since all detection schemes use the machine learning technique,
each detection scheme can be described by the features they choose to extract
from the accounts.
B. Data Collection
Before analyzing these existing methods, new labeled data must be collected
for training and testing. In this section, the methods for collecting data from
Twitter are described. First, a large sample of data is taken from Twitter using
the Twitter API [26]. Then, this data is analyzed using various methods in
order to find and label spammers to be used to train the previous detection
schemes.
1. Crawling Twitter
Typical graph traversing algorithms, such as depth first search (DFS) and
breadth first search (BFS) tend to create sampling biases when only crawl-
ing a portion of a given graph [27]. To avoid such a bias, a new graph traversal
method is used. First, 20 seed accounts are gathered from Twitter’s public time-
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line. Using Twitter API, each access to Twitter’s public timeline returns the
20 most recent tweets [28]. The author account of each tweet is then used as a
seed account. For each of these 20 seed accounts, their followers and followings
are also crawled. For each crawled account, all data available from Twitter is
stored in a database. Then a new set of seed users are obtained from the public
timeline. This reduces the amount of bias since the randomness of the public
timeline ensures that not all of the crawled users come from the neighborhood
of one particularly popular user.
This crawl resulted in the collection of information from nearly 500,000
users. Table I shows the details on how many users and tweets were crawled.
The spammer identification method used, which will be explained further in
the next section, relies heavily on the URLs that users put in their tweets. For
this reason the URLs were extracted from the users’ tweets. Typically users of
Twitter will use URL shortening tools to shrink the number of characters that
make up a URL. This is due to the 140 character per tweet limitation. These
tools create a webpage that has no content and does nothing more than redirect
to the destination web page. A spammer that is trying to hide the actual URL
might use several redirections, creating a redirection chain. Since the spammer
identification method relies on having the final URL, a URL redirection tracing
technique tracks these redirection chains to the final URL.
2. Identifying Spam Accounts
In this section, the method for identifying spammers in the dataset for the
labeled data will be detailed. There are several different types of spammers.
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Table I. Twitter Crawl Summary
Name Value
Number of Twitter accounts 485,721
Number of Followings 791,648,649
Number of Followers 855,772,191
Number of tweets 14,401,157
Number of URLs Extracted 5,805,351
This work focuses on spammers that post links to malicious websites such as
phishing or malware hosting sites.
a. Identifying Suspect Accounts
To discover these spammers, two blacklists, Google Safe Browsing [29] and
PhishTank [30], are used along with Capture-HPC, a high-interaction honeypot
client to identify websites that are either hosting malware or phishing for private
information. Each tweet containing at least one of these malicious URLs is
considered to be a spam tweet. The ratio of spam tweets to normal tweets from
a particular account is defined as the spam tweet ratio. Since non-malicious
Twitter users may accidentally post a link to a website that is hosting malware
or a phishing website, this work focuses on those that have a high spam tweet
ratio. Accounts that have a spam tweet ratio higher than 10% are considered
suspect accounts. Any accounts that are not suspect accounts are considered
normal users and may be used as labeled data in the machine learning algorithm.
There were 2,933 suspect accounts found in this dataset which were then subject
to manual verification.
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b. Manual Verification
To manually verify whether or not an account is spam, the definition of spam
from Section B is used. Recall that this definition is rather loose in that it
relies on understanding the intentions of a Twitter account. Since this work
relies on the accounts labeled as spam to indeed be spam, the verifiers were
asked to assume each account was innocent unless their malicious intentions
were obvious. The verifiers attempt to judge whether the account is trying
to deceive users into violating The Twitter Rules or giving up their money or
personal information. There are a few scenarios where a non-malicious account
would post many malicious links: 1) These links have been incorrectly labeled by
the blacklist; 2) The account incorrectly believes these links are non-malicious;
3) The account posted links to a non-malicious website which then became
compromised. If any of these seem to be the case, then the intentions of the
account are judged to be benign.
The manual verification process involves three different parties that judge
each suspect account. If the first two manual verifiers disagree on the intention
of a particular account, the third makes the final judgment. This method
minimizes human error, however, it does not eliminate it. While the use of
erroneous data is undesirable, it is acceptable due to the large dataset. All
spam detection systems face the problem of a noisy dataset and therefore the
algorithms must be robust enough to overcome this difficulty. Also, there may
be other malicious accounts in the dataset that were not found. This is due to
the fact that this work focuses on a particular type of spammer. Also, blacklists
are not perfect and may miss some malicious URLs. For this reason, the number
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of spammers identified is a lower bound on the total number of spammers in
the dataset. However, even with this subset of spammers, this work can show
that they are using evasion tactics to avoid detection. From the 2,933 suspect
accounts 2,060 were verified to be spammers.
First, nearly 500,000 users were crawled from Twitter. These accounts’
tweets were analyzed and those accounts that post a high percentage of black-
listed URLs are considered suspect accounts. From the nearly 500,000 crawled
users, 2,933 were considered to be suspect accounts and from those 2,060 were
manually verified as spam accounts. Next this labeled data is used to train and
evaluate the existing detection schemes.
C. Testing Detection Schemes
In this section, the methodology for testing the detection schemes is described.
These detection schemes are being tested to find evasive spammers. Since these
schemes use the machine learning technique, the labeled data used, the features
used and the machine learning algorithm will be described.
1. Labeled Data
This test uses 500 of the labeled spam accounts as well as 5000 non-spam
accounts. The non-spam accounts are collected from those accounts that did
not post any malicious URLs. There may be some undetected spam accounts
in the 5000 non-spam accounts, however, one must expect to work with a noisy
data set in real world situations.
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2. Feature Extraction
Each existing detection scheme is described in previous works. For each of
the 5,500 accounts the features listed in these works were extracted from the
crawled data set. These features are enumerated in Chapter VII.
3. Machine Learning Algorithm
Each existing detection scheme used various machine learning algorithms and
some compared the performance of several. To make a fair comparison, the
same machine learning algorithm is used to evaluate each feature set. The
decision tree algorithm is a commonly used algorithm and it also allows for
easier analysis since the model created by the algorithm is human-readable.
For these reasons, the J48 decision tree algorithm [31] is used to analyze the
existing feature sets.
In order to evaluate the feature sets, 10 fold cross validation is used to
find which spammers are incorrectly classified as non-spammers. A spammer
that is incorrectly classified as a non-spammer is an evasive spammer. Each
feature set has its own set of evasive spammers and each group is analyzed
separately to discover evasion tactics. The evaluation of these detection schemes
will be shown in detail along with the evaluation of the new detection scheme
in Chapter VIII.
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CHAPTER V
ANALYZING EVASION TACTICS
This chapter will discuss the ways in which spammers have begun to evade
existing detection schemes. The previous chapter showed that existing tech-
niques have been able to detect spammers with high accuracy, however, new
data shows that new spammers are taking actions to evade these existing detec-
tion schemes. This chapter uses a set of users called evasive spammers. These
are a set of spammers, identified in the previous chapter, that have evaded
existing detection schemes. That is, these spammers were falsely classified as
normal by existing detection algorithms. There are three different sets of evasive
spammers, one from each existing method.
A. Description of Evasion Tactics
The main evasion tactics are utilized by the spammers to evade existing detec-
tion approaches and can be categorized into the following two types: profile-
based feature evasion tactics and content-based feature evasion tactics.
1. Profile-based Evasion
A common intuition for discovering Twitter spam accounts can originate from
accounts’ basic profile information such as number of followers and number
of tweets, since these indicators usually reflect Twitter accounts’ reputation.
To evade such profile-based detection features, spammers mainly utilize tactics
including gaining more followers and posting more tweets.
24
Gaining More Followers: In general, the number of a Twitter account’s
followers reflects its popularity and credibility. A higher number of followers of
an account commonly implies that more users trust this account and would like
to receive the information from it. Thus, many profile-based detection features
such as number of followers, fofo ratio (The ratio of the number of an account’s
following to its followers.) [12, 15] and reputation score [14] are built based on
this number. To evade these features or break Twitter’s 2,000 Following Limit
Policy (According to this policy, if the number of followings of an account
exceeds 2,000, this number must not be much more than the number of the
account’s followers.) [32], spammers can mainly adopt the following strategies
to gain more followers. The first strategy is to purchase followers from websites.
These websites charge a fee and then use an arsenal of Twitter accounts to
follow their customers. The specific methods of providing these accounts may
differ from site to site. The second strategy is to exchange followers with other
users. This method is usually assisted by a third party website. These sites
use existing customers’ accounts to follow new customers’ accounts. Since this
method does only require Twitter accounts to follow several other accounts to
gain more followers without any payment, Twitter spammers can get around
the referral clause by creating more fraudulent accounts. In addition, Twitter
spammers can gain followers for their accounts by using their own created fake
accounts. Spammers will create a bunch of fake accounts then follow their spam
accounts with these fake accounts.
Posting More Tweets: Similar to the number of an account’s followers,
an account’s tweet number usually reflects how much this account has con-
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tributed to the whole online social platform. A higher tweet number of an
account usually implies that this account is more active and willing to share
information with others. Thus, this feature is also widely used in the existing
Twitter spammers detection approaches (e.g. [15]). To evade this feature,
spammers can post more Tweets to behave more like legitimate accounts, espe-
cially recurring to utilizing some public tweeting tools or software [33].
2. Content-based Evasion
Another common indicator for distinguishing spam accounts is the content of
a suspect account’s tweets. As discussed in Chapter III, a majority of spam
accounts make profit by alluring legitimate users to click the malicious URLs
posted in their spam tweets. Those malicious URLs direct users to websites
that cause harm to their computers or scam them out of their money. Thus, the
percentage of tweets containing URLs is an effective indicator of spam accounts,
which is utilized in works such as [12, 15, 14]. In addition, since many spammers
post the same or similar malicious tweets in order to increase visibility, their
published tweets show strong homogeneous characteristics. In this way, many
existing approaches design content-based features such as tweet similarity [12,
15] and duplicate tweet count [14] to detect spam accounts. To evade such
content-based detection features, spammers use tactics such as mixing normal
tweets and posting heterogeneous tweets.
Mixing Normal Tweets: Spammers can utilize this tactic to evade
content-based features such as URL ratio, unique URL ratio and hashtag ra-
tio [12, 14]. These normal tweets without malicious URLs may be hand-crafted
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or obtained from arbitrary users’ tweets or consist of meaningless words. By
mixing such normal tweets, spam accounts are able to dilute their spam tweets
and make it more difficult for a detector to distinguish them from legitimate
accounts.
Posting Heterogeneous Tweets: Spammers can post heterogeneous
tweets to evade the content-based features such as tweet similarity and duplicate
tweet count. Specifically, in this tactic, spammers post tweets with the same
semantic meaning but with different terms. In this way, not only can the
spammers maintain the same semantic meanings to allure victims, but also they
can make their tweets variational enough to not be caught by detectors that rely
on such content-based features. In fact, many public tools, e.g. Spinbot [17],
can help spammers to spin a few different spam tweets into hundreds of variable
tweets with the same semantic meaning but different words.
B. Validation of Evasion Scenarios
In this section, we aim to validate the four evasion tactics described in the
previous section by showing real case studies and public services/tools that
can be utilized by the spammers. We also implement existing detection
schemes [12, 15, 14] and evaluate them on our collected examination data set.
By analyzing the spammers missed (false negatives) by these works, we can show
that many spammers have indeed evolved to behave like legitimate accounts to
evade existing detection features.
Gaining More Followers: As described in previously in this chapter,
spammers can gain more followers by purchasing them, exchanging them and
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creating fake accounts. In fact, several public websites allow for the direct
purchase of followers. The rates per follower for each website vary. Table II
shows that followers can be purchased for small amounts of money on several
different websites, even including the online bidding website – Ebay, which can
be seen in Fig. 1(a).
Table II. Price of Online Follower Trading
Website Price Per Follower
BuyTwitterFriends.com $0.0049
TweetSourcer.com $0.0060
UnlimitedTwitterFollowers.com $0.0074
Twitter1k.com $0.0209
SocialKik.com $0.0150
USocial.net $0.0440
Tweetcha.com $0.0470
PurchaseTwitterFollowers.com $0.0490
Also, Fig. 1(b) shows a real online website from which users can directly
buy followers. From this figure, we can find that, spammers can buy followers
at a very cheap price. The website also claims that the user can buy targeted
followers with specific keywords in their tweets.
(a) Bidding followers from Ebay (b) Purchasing followers from website
Fig. 1. Online Twitter Follower Trading Website
After showing these online services through which spammers can obtain
more followers, we examine the detection features of number of followers and
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fofo ratio from three existing work on our collected dataset. In particular, we
draw the distribution of these two metrics of three sets of accounts: missed
spammers (false negatives) in each of three existing approaches [12, 15, 14], all
accounts (around 500,000 collected accounts), and all spammers (2,060 identi-
fied spammers). To better show the results, we label the results from [14] as
A, [12] as B and [15] as C. From Fig. 2(a) and 2(b), we can see that the
distributions of these two indicators of those missed spammers by the existing
approaches are more similar to that of all accounts than that of all spammers.
This observation shows that many spammers pretend to be more legitimate by
gaining more followers.
Posting More Tweets: Besides using the web to post tweets, spammers
can utilize some softwares such as AutoTwitter [33] and Twitter API [26] to
automatically post more tweets on their profiles. Fig. 2(c) shows the distribu-
tion of the numbers of tweets of the missed spammers in each of three existing
approaches, all spammmers and all accounts. From this figure, we can find that
missed spammers (false negatives) post much more tweets than all spammers,
even though the tweet numbers of all spammmers are much lower than that of
all accounts. This observation also implies that spammers are trying to post
more tweets to not to be recognized as spammers.
Mixing Normal Tweets: Based on observations of the missed spammers
by the existing work, we can find that some of them post non-spam tweets
to dilute their spam tweet percentage. Fig. 3(a) shows a real example of a
spammer that posts famous quotes, “Winning isn’t everything, but wanting to
win is. – Vince Lombardi”, between tweets containing links to phishing and
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(a) Number of followers (b) Fofo Ratio (b) Number of tweets
Fig. 2. Profile-based Feature Examination on Three Existing Works
scam websites.
Posting Heterogeneous Tweets: In order to avoid detection features
such as tweet similarity and duplicate tweet count, spammers use tools to ‘spin’
their tweets so that they can have heterogeneous tweets with the same semantic
meaning but with totally different words. Fig. 3(b) shows a spammer that posts
various messages encouraging users to sign up for a service that is eventually
a trap to steal users’ email addresses. Notice that the spammer uses three
different phrases that have the same semantic meaning: “I will get more. You
can too!”, “you will get more.”, and “want get more, you need to check”. An
example of automatical tools that can be used to create such heterogeneous
tweets, called spin-bot, is shown in Fig. 3(c). By typing a phrase into the large
text field and pressing “Process Text”, a new phrase with the same semantic
meaning and yet different words is generated in the small text field below.
(a) Mixing Normal Tweets (b) Posting Heterogeneous Tweets (c) Spin-bot
Fig. 3. Case Studies for Content-based Feature Evasion Tactics
This chapter showed statistical evidence that spammers are using tech-
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niques to avoid detection. After analysis of the evasive spammers, hypotheses
of their techniques were created. These hypotheses were then verified with
data analysis. With these techniques in mind, the next chapter will design new
features that make it more difficult for spammers to evade detection.
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CHAPTER VI
DESIGNING A NEW DETECTION SCHEME
The previous chapters have analyzed existing detection schemes and identified
tactics that spammers use to evade these detection schemes. With these tactics
in mind, this chapter attempts to design a detection scheme that will be more
robust against spammers’ evasion techniques. The machine learning model is
ideal because it can quickly be retrained against new adaptive spammers and
automatically classify unknown accounts. The weakness of this model that
the spammers are attacking is the feature set. The spammers change their
behavior to make their features appear normal. In order to make a more robust
detection scheme, more robust features are required. A robust feature should be
difficult for the spammer to change or should be expensive for the spammer to
change. A feature is difficult to evade if it requires a fundamental change in the
way a spammer performs its malicious deeds. A feature is expensive to evade
if evasion requires the spammer to spend money, time or resources in order
to evade detection. The newly designed features include three Graph-based
features, three Neighbor-based features, three Automation-based features and
one Timing-based feature. The details of these features will be introduced in
the following sections.
A. Graph-based Features
Twitter can be considered as a graph where each Twitter account i is a vertex
and each follow relationship is a directed edge e. It is cheap and easy for a
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spammer to change their tweeting behavior or add more followers, however, it
is difficult for them to change their behavior in the graph. Based on this intu-
ition, this work presents three graph-based features: local clustering coefficient,
betweenness centrality and bi-directional links ratio.
1. Local Clustering Coefficient
The local clustering coefficient [34] of a vertex is the number of pairs of its
neighbors that have edges between them to the number of pairs of neighbors
that do not have edges between them. This is an intuitive feature because the
neighbors of a legitimate account are more likely to know each than those of a
spam account. For example, a Twitter user may follow all of his co-workers who
also follow each other. This account will have a high local clustering coefficient.
On the other hand, a spammer may follow random people that do not follow
each other. This spammer will have a low local clustering coefficient.
For each vertex v in the Twitter graph, its local clustering score can be
computed by Equation (6.1), where Kv is the total degree of the vertex and
{eij} is the total number of the edges among all vertex v’s neighbors.
LC(v) =
2|{eij}|
Kv · (Kv − 1) (6.1)
2. Betweenness Centrality
Betweenness centrality [35] is a centrality measure of a vertex within a graph.
Vertices that occur on many shortest paths between other vertices have a higher
betweenness centrality than those that do not. This metric will reflect the posi-
tion of the vertex in the graph. Nodes that occur in many shortest paths have
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higher values of betweenness centrality. A Twitter spammer wil typically use
a shotgun approach to finding victims, which means it will follow many other
accounts without regard for whom they are or with whom these victims are
connected. As a result, many of their victims are unrelated accounts, and thus
their shortest path between each other is the average shortest path between all
nodes in the graph. When the Twitter spammer follows these unrelated ac-
counts, this creates a new shortest path of length 2 between any victim followee
of the spam account and any other victim followee, through the spam account.
This is illustrated in Figure 4 (a). Thus, the spam account will be on many
such shortest paths between its neighbors and the betweenness centrality of the
spammer will be high. On the other hand, a typical Twitter user may follow
many people interested in the same topic and these people are more likely to
have direct connections, which would not put the typical Twitter user on a
shortest path between these users, giving the typical Twitter user a lower be-
tweenness centrality than the typical spammer. This is illustrated in Figure 4
(b).
(a) Spammer (b) Normal
Fig. 4. Shortest Paths Between Neighbors of a Spammer (red) and a Normal
User (green)
In a directed graph, betweenness centrality of each vertex v can be com-
34
puted by Equation 6.2, where δst is the number of shortest paths from s to t,
and δst(v) is the number of shortest paths from s to t that pass through a vertex
v, and n is the total number of vertexes in the graph.
BC(v) =
1
(n− 1)(n− 2) ·
∑
s 6=v 6=t∈V
δst(v)
δst
(6.2)
3. Bi-directional Links Ratio
As mentioned in Chapter IV, the number of bi-directional links has been used
as a feature by existing work. However, Twitter spammers can easily evade
this feature by purchasing followers and following them back. In order to make
this feature a bit more robust, the number of bi-directional links is compared to
the total number of users an account follows. The intuition behind this feature
is that it is difficult and dangerous for Twitter spammers to increase their
bi-directional links ratio. For each legitimate user they want to follow, they
would have to gain another bi-directional link to keep this ratio the same. Thus
they would need to purchase followers, incurring a cost, and then follow these
purchased followers back. Following these purchased followers back also puts
them in close relationship with likely low reputation or fake accounts, which is
not good for their account’s reputation. Thus, compared with the high number
of users they follow, their bi-directional links ratio will be difficult to forge.
Bi-directional links ratio (Rbilink), can be computed in Equation 6.3.
Rbilink =
Nbilink
Nfing
(6.3)
where Nbilink and Nf ing denote the number of bi-directional links and the num-
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ber of following.
B. Neighbor-based Features
The next set of features are based on the intuition that spammer can easily
modify his own behavior, however he cannot easily modify the behavior of the
accounts that he follows. These are called neighbor-based features and include:
average neighbors’ followers, average neighbors’ tweets and followings to median
neighbors’ followers.
1. Neighbors’ Follower Quality
Neighbors’ follower quality, denoted as Fqual, of an account v represents the
quality of an account’s neighbors. Since an account’s follower number usually
reflects the account’s popularity or quality, this feature can be quanitfied by
the average number of followers of an account’s neighbors. Legitimate accounts
tend to follow accounts of high follower quality that have many followers unlike
spammers who try to get the attention of normal users who have few followers.
Thus, legitimate accounts typically have higher neighbors’ follower quality than
spammers.
Average neighbor’s followers can be computed as Equation (6.4).
Fqual(v) =
1
|Nfing(v)| ·
∑
u∈Nfing(v)
Nfer(u) (6.4)
where Nfer and Nf ing denote the number of followers and followings, respec-
tively.
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2. Neighbors’ Tweet Quality
Another good quality of a Twitter account is the number of Tweets. A legiti-
mate user typically wants to follow users that will provide them with informa-
tion, meaning they will Tweet often. On the other hand, spammers want to
follow legitimate users who do not Tweet as much. For this reason, neighbors’
tweet quality, denoted as Tqual, is the average number of Tweets of an accounts
neighbors. Section VII shows that these two features can be evaded by follow-
ing popular Twitter accounts, however, the spammer will need to buy more
followers to keep his following follower ratio low.
3. Enhanced Neighbors’ Follower Quality
Most of the users a spammer will follow will be potential victims, which are
typical Twitter users. These users have small follower counts, thus the median
number of followers of a spam account’s followees, Mnfer will be small. How-
ever, some typical users may mostly follow their friends, other typical Twitter
accounts and also have small values for Mnfer. A big difference between a typ-
ical Twitter account is the number of followees. Thus, the ratio between the
number of followees and Mnfer, Rfing mnfer, will be different for spammers and
typical Twitter accounts. Typical Twitter accounts will follow few users com-
pared to the large number of users that a typical spam account will follow, thus
the value for Rfing mnfer will be low for typical users and high for spammers.
Other typical users may follow only popular Twitter accounts. Thus they will
have a high value for Mnfer, but with their low number of followers, the value
for Rfing mnfer will remain low for this type of typical Twitter user as well.
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This metric can be computed by Equation 6.5.
Rfing mnfer =
Nfing
Mnfer
(6.5)
C. Automation-based Features
In order for a spammer to make a great profit, he must control many spam
accounts at once. This is done through writing automated programs to control
groups of accounts at once. These programs must use the Twitter API to make
these accounts post tweets and follow users. The next features take advantage
of this behavior pattern.
1. API Ratio
API ratio is the ratio of the number of tweets posted using API to the total
number of tweets posted. As existing work [36] shows, many bots choose to use
API to post tweets, so a high API ratio implies this account is more suspicious.
2. API URL Ratio
Some non malicious accounts may have created their own automated tools for
posting harmless tweets to Twitter. Thus, the API tweets themselves must be
analyzed to determine if they are spam. Thus, the ratio of API posts containing
URLs is an indicator. A high API URL ratio indicates that the user is using
API to automatically post spam.
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3. API Tweet Similarity
Along the same logic, if tweets posted using API are more likely to be spam
tweets, they should be analyzed more closely. The similarity between API tweets
helps to determine if the API tweets are being automated. If they are similar,
they are likely being automated by a spammer controlled program, other wise
they may be coming from a legitimate user’s program.
D. Timing-based Features
Similar to other timing-based features such as “tweet rate” presented in [13],
we also design another feature named “following rate”.
1. Following Rate
“Following rate” reflects the speed at which an account follows other accounts.
An extremely high value of the following rate is suspicious since it indicates
a user is following many other users in a short time and may be spamming.
Twitter does not allow us to collect the times at which a user followed another
user, thus the following rate must be estimated. To estimate the following rate,
the number of followings of an account is divided by the age of the account
(current time - time of creation).
These features will be a part of the feature set used for the new detec-
tion scheme. Next, the robustness of existing detection features and our newly
designed features is formalized in Chapter VII. Then, existing effective fea-
tures are combined with newly designed features to complete the new detection
scheme which is then evaluated on the new dataset. The specific evaluation
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results can be seen in Chapter VIII.
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CHAPTER VII
ANALYSIS OF DETECTION SCHEMES
In this chapter, the existing detection schemes and the newly designed detection
scheme are analyzed. Since each scheme is based on the features that they use
to describe Twitter accounts, the features themselves will be analyzed. The
robustness of each feature is formalized and this chapter shows that the new
features are more robust than the older features.
A. Formalizing Feature Robustness
In this section, a formal definition of a robust detection feature is given and
each feature is evaluated based on this definition.
1. Formalizing Robustness
Before analyzing the robustness of each feature in detail, a model is created to
quantify the robustness of a detection feature. A robust feature should either
be difficult for the spammer to change or it should be expensive to change.
Spammers are constantly trying to avoid detection while at the same time trying
to achieve malicious goals. Based on these priorities, the robustness of each
feature F , denoted as R(F ), can be viewed as the tradeoff between a spammer’s
cost C(F ) to avoid detection and the profits P (F ) earned by achieving malicious
goals. Thus, the robustness of each feature can be computed by Equation 7.1.
This is intuitive because the higher the cost is compared to the profit, the more
41
robust the feature.
R(F ) = C(F )− P (F ) (7.1)
Thus, if the cost of evading a detection feature is higher than the profits, then
the feature is robust. To quantify a successful evasion of a particular detection
feature F , a threshold value TF is used to denote the value a spammer needs
to obtain to evade the feature. The cost for a spammer to evade detection
includes three types of costs: monetary cost, operational cost and time. The
monetary cost is mostly from having to pay to obtain high numbers of followers.
The operational cost is related to posting tweets or following specific accounts.
Let Ctwt and Cfollow denote the cost for a spammer to post one tweet or follow
one specific account and let Cfer denote the cost for a spammer to obtain
one follower. A spammer’s profits are achieved by attracting the attention of
legitimate accounts, thus, a Twitter spammer’s profits can be measured by the
number of users they can follow and the number of spam tweets that they can
post. Pfing and Pmt are used to denote the profit of supporting one following
account and posting one spam tweet, respectively. Let Nfing and Nmt denote
the number of accounts that the spammer desires to follow and the number of
malicious tweets that the spammer desires to post.
This section analyzes the robustness of each of the following six categories
of features: profile-based features, content-based features, neighbor-based fea-
tures, graph-based features, timing-based features and automation-based fea-
tures. The summary of these features can be seen in the table on page 49. In
this table, features labeled with “this” means this feature is included in this
work’s detection scheme.
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2. Profile-based Features
As described in Chapter V, the spammer usually evades this type of detection
feature by obtaining more followers. The following follower ratio of an account
is a representative feature of profile-based features. According to Equation
7.1, the robustness of the following follower ratio detection feature(F3) can be
computed by Equation (7.2).
R(F3) =
Nfing
TF3
· Cfer −Nfing · Pfing (TF3 ≥ 1) (7.2)
For example, if the maximum threshold for F3, TF3 is 2, then for every 2
potential victims the spammer follows, the spammer will have to buy 1 follower.
Thus,
Nfing
TF3
is the number of followers that the spammer will have to purchase.
Table II, shows that Cfer is inexpensive. The number of users that must be
exposed to the spam content before one is tricked into becoming a victim has
many factors and is unknown. However, even if only 1 user in every 1,000
viewers becomes a victim, then the spammer would need to follow 1,000 users
which means he would need to buy 500 followers(assuming TF3 = 2) which
costs $23.50 per victim. This amount is based on the most expensive price per
follower from Table II in Chapter V. This cost is much smaller than the 1,000s
of dollars that could be stolen from the single victim through identity theft [9].
This shows that this feature is not robust because the cost of evasion is much
smaller than the potential profits. Similar conclusions can be drawn for features
F1, F2 and F4.
For the feature F6, since the age of an account is determined by the time
when the account is created, which cannot be changed or modified by the spam-
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mers, this feature is difficult to evade. A spammer may try to evade this feature
by obtaining an existing Twitter account. However, unlike obtaining followers,
obtaining a specific Twitter account will be very expensive. For example, the
bid value to purchase a Twitter account that steadily has over 1,390 followers
is $1,550 [37]. Another way to evade account age is to create a set of accounts
and wait for several months before using these accounts. However, this costs
the spammer time, which makes the spammer less effective. Thus the account
age feature is fairly robust.
3. Content-based Features
Content-based features can be divided into two types: signature-based features
(F7, F8, F9, and F10) and similarity-based features (F11, and F12). As discussed
in Chapter V, both types of features can be evaded by automatically posting
signature avoidng tweets or diverse tweets. Also, by using these tactics, the
spammers post more tweets, thus evading the feature of the number of tweets
(F5).
Without loss of generality, the analysis of the robustness of the URL ratio
feature (F7) will be used to demonstrate the analysis of this type of feature. In
order to maintain a low URL ratio, one must post non-spam tweets that do not
contain URLs. However, the more non-spam tweets one posts, the less likely a
potential victim is to see the spam tweets. If a spammer posts Nst spam tweets
containing malicious URLs and Ntwt total tweets, then the robustness of the
URL ratio can be computed by Equation 7.3.
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R(F7) =
Nmt
TF7
· Ctwt − Nmt
Ntwt
· Pmt (TF7 ≤ 1) (7.3)
The cost to evade this feature is small. To evade this feature, a spammer
needs only to post a sufficient number of non-spam tweets which is inexpensive
and easy to do. However, the power of this feature comes from forcing the
spammer to dilute his spam tweets with non-spam tweets, which decreases the
overall profit that an account will make. This is shown in Equation 7.3 because
when a spammer posts many non-spam tweets, the value of Nmt
Ntwt
decreases and
thus the profit decreases. Therefore, the URL ratio feature is fairly robust.
4. Graph-based Features
The graph-based features can be divided into two types: reciprocity-based fea-
tures (bi-directional link count and bi-directional link ratio) and position-based
features (F15 and F16). First the robustness of reciprocity-based features will
be dicussed.
Let CBiLink denote the cost to obtain one bi-directional link. The robust-
ness of bi-directional link count (F13) can then be computed in Equation 7.4.
R(F13) = TF13 · CBiLink − (Nfing −Nbi−link) · Pfing (7.4)
This equation shows that the cost of evading the bi-directional link count
is CBiLink times TF13 , the number of bi-directional links needed to evade this
feature. The profit is affected by the number of bi-directional links required.
Each bi-directional link forces a spammer to follow a social butterfly or a created
dummy account. This spammer could have instead followed another possible
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victim. Thus this feature is only slightly robust.
The next feature, bi-directional link ratio (F14), is an improved version of
bi-directional link count. The robustness of the bi-directional link ratio feature
is calculated in Equation 7.5.
R(F14) = TF14 ·Nfing · CBiLink − (Nfing −Nbi−link) · Pfing (7.5)
In this equation, the profit is the same as it is for bi-directional link count,
however, the cost is different. Using a ratio instead of just the count requires
that the number of bi-directional links needed scales with the number of users
an account follows. Thus, for a spam account that follows many accounts, he
will need to obtain many bi-directional links to appear normal. The average
value of the bi-directional links ratio is 22.1% [18] and spammers usually follow
a large number of accounts, thus, the spammers need to obtain many more
bi-directional links to show a normal bi-directional links ratio. This feature can
still be evaded by gaining enough bi-directional links through following social
butterflies and creating dummy accounts. However, the spammer will have to
dedicate approximately 20% of the users he follows to these accounts that will
follow him back. That 20% of accounts could have been potential victims, which
makes this spammer less effective.
Next the position-based features will be evaluated. These features include
betweenness centrality (F15) and clustering coefficent (F16). The strength be-
hind these features lyes in their abstractness and difficulty to change. The
average Twitter user does not concern themselves with their position in the
graph, which affects these values. Also, there is no benefit for a spammer to
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change these values either, unless they are aware that these indicators are being
used to detect their accounts. Suppose a spammer was aware of these features
and wanted to avoid them. In order to have a smaller betweenness centrality or
a higher clustering coefficient, a spammer would have to ensure that he followed
accounts that were related to other accounts that he follows. This is possible,
however, a spammer cannot be as effective if the users that he can follow are
limited. Thus, these features are robust.
5. Neighbor-based Features
The first two neighbor-based features reflect the quality of an account’s friends
choice and were discussed in Section VI. Let Nfollow denote the number of high
quality accounts (accounts with many followers) that a spammer needs to follow
to get a high enough Anfer to evade feature F17, then the robustness of F17 can
be computed as Eq.( 7.6).
R(F17) = Nfollow · Cfollow (7.6)
Since there are many popular accounts with many followers, Nfollow and Cfollow
could be small. Thus, as long as the spammers know about this detection
feature, they can evade it easily. Similar results can be gained for feature F18.
However, for feature F19, since the median is used instead of the mean of
the neighbors’ follower count, at least half of the users they follow must be
popular accounts to evade this feature. Since spammers follow many users,
the cost of evading this feature will be very high and the profit will decrease
dramatically for the spammers to evade this feature. So, feature F19 is fairly
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robust.
6. Timing-based Features
The timing-based features are related to spammers’ update behavior. In order
to evade the following rate feature (F20), a spammer will need to follow users at
a slow pace and in order to evade the tweet-rate feature (F21) a spammer can
simply post tweets at a normal rate as well. However easy these features are to
evade, they require the spammer to slow down his operation in order to do so,
which costs the spammer valuable time. For these reasons, feature F20 and F21
are both relatively robust.
7. Automation-based Features
In order to publish the amount of tweets required for a successful spam cam-
paign, many spammers use automated programs to manage several spam ac-
counts. These types of software are also helpful in evading content-based fea-
tures. In order to create custom automation programs, spammers will use the
Twitter API as it is the best way to interface with Twitter programmatically.
Let Ctwt web and Ctwt api denote the cost of using web and api to post one
tweet. Since it takes time to manually log in to Twitter for each account and
post a tweet Ctwt web  Ctwt api. If a spammer wants to use API to post spam
or malicious tweets on Nspam different spam accounts, which is very common in
practice, then the robustness of feature F22 can be computed as Equation 7.7.
R(F22) = Nspam·[Nmt
TF22
·(1−TF22)·Ctwt web+Nmt·Ctwt api]−Nspam·Nmt·Pmt (7.7)
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Since fewer legitimate accounts would use the Twitter API to post tweets, the
value of TF22 should be small. In this way, since Ctwt web  Ctwt api if a spammer
wants to control many spam accounts and post a large number of tweets, the
cost will be relatively high. The conclusions for the rest of this type of feature
are similar.
It is noticeable that only using feature F22 would lead to false positives since
legitimate accounts may also use API to post tweets. However, by combining
features F22, F23, and F24, it will decrease those false positives since only a
few legitimate accounts would use the Twitter API to post very similar tweets
containing URLs as spammers do.
Using the same method as above, the robustness of all features has been
categorized into the following three scales: low, medium and high. The sum-
mary of this information can be seen in Chapter VIII. The information provided
in that chapter shows that several of the features used by existing works are
not very robust, such as the number of tweets and the number of bi-directional
links and several of the new features presented in this work are robust such as
clustering coefficient and bi-directional link ratio.
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Table III. Detection Feature Robustness
Index Category Feature Work Robustness
F1 Profile the number of followers (Nfer, ) [14] Low
F2 Profile the number of followings (Nfing) [15], [14] Low
F3 Profile fofo ratio (Rfofo) [12], [15], this Medium
F4 Profile reputation (Rep) [14] Medium
F5 Profile the number of tweets (Ntwt) [15], this Low
F6 Profile age [12], this High
F7 Content URL ratio (RURL) [12], [15], [14], this Low
F8 Content unique URL ratio [12], this Low
F9 Content hashtag(#) ratio [14] Low
F10 Content reply(@) ratio, [14] [12] Low
F11 Content tweet similarity (Tsim) [12], [15], this Low
F12 Content duplicate tweet count [14] Low
F13 Graph the number of bi-directional links (Nbilink) [12] Low
F14 Graph bi-directional links ratio (Rbilink) this Medium
F15 Graph betweenness centrality (BC) this High
F16 Graph clustering coefficient (CC) this High
F17 Neighbor average neighbors’ followers (Anfer) this Low
F18 Neighbor average neighbors’ tweets (Antwt) this Low
F19 Neighbor (Rfing mnfer) this High
F20 Timing following rate (FR) this Low
F21 Timing tweet rate (TR) [12], this Low
F22 Automation API ratio (RAPI) this Medium
F23 Automation API URL ratio (RAPI URL) this Medium
F24 Automation API Tweet Similarity (Tapi sim) this Medium
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CHAPTER VIII
EVALUATION
This chapter, presents an evaluation of the performance of the new detection
scheme. This scheme uses a feature set that contains 9 existing effective features
and 10 newly designed features including the following features F2 F8, F11 and
F14 F24, which were chosen using feature selection techniques. The names of
the features can be seen in Table III.
The features set is evaluated by running the machine learning technique on
two different data sets: Data set I and Data set II. Data set I refers to the 5,500
Twitter accounts that are described in Chapter IV. To decrease the effects
of sampling bias and show the quality of the new detection feature schema
without using URL analysis as ground truth, another dataset containing 35,000
Twitter accounts was crawled and 3,500 accounts were randomly selected to
build another data set, denoted as Data set II.
A. Comparison of Detection Schemes
In this section, three experiments are performed using Dataset I to evaluate
the new detection scheme: performance comparison, feature effectiveness and
learning curve.
1. Performance Comparison
In this experiment, the new detection scheme is compared against the existing
schemes: [12] using 10 features, [15] using 8 features and [14] using 7 features.
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The details of the features used in these three works can be seen in Table III.
The evaluation is performed using four different machine learning algorithms:
Random Forest (RF), Decision Tree (DT) , Bayes Net (BN) and Decorate (DE).
In the results, the new scheme will be labeled as A, [12] will be labeled as B,
[15] will be labeled as C and [14] will be labeled as D.
For each machine learning classifier, ten-fold cross validation is used to find
the false negatives, false positives and F-measure. As seen in the Figure 5, the
new approach outperforms the existing schemes.
(a) False Positive Rate (b) Detection Rate (c) F-Measure
Fig. 5. Performance Comparison with the Existing Approaches
While maintaining a low false positive rate, the detection rate of the new
scheme increases to 85%, compared with the detection rate of 51% for the
worst detector (D [14]) and the detection rate of 73% for the best other existing
detector (B [12]). Here detection rate refers to the percentage of spammers
that were correctly classified. F-measure is a metric that balances precision,
the percentage of users that the scheme classified as spammers that actually
are spam with recall, the percentage of spammers that were correctly identified.
The F-measure used here is F-1 which balances these values equally. The new
approach has the highest F-1 rank with each algorithm. This better performance
comes from the ability of the new detection scheme to be robust against evasion
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tactics that are able to avoid the existing detection schemes. Next the individual
features are evaluated using feature selection techniques.
2. Evasive Users Caught
Figure 6 shows the number of spammers that evaded each feature set. This
figure also shows how many of those evasive spammers were caught by the
new detection scheme. The new algorithm is able to catch a majority of the
spammers that the existing detection schemes missed. Notice that the difference
between the number of evasive spammers and the number of those spammers
caught is similar for each existing scheme. This shows that there is a group
of super evasive spammers that evaded each scheme including the new scheme.
Detecting these super evasive spammers is left for future work.
Fig. 6. Evasive Spammers Caught
3. Feature Evaluation
To further validate the effectiveness of the newly designed features, the per-
formance of two feature sets is compared. The first feature set consists of the
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features used in the previous experiment without the newly designed features.
The second feature set consists of all features used in the previous experiment.
Table IV, shows that for each classifier, with the addition of the newly designed
features, the detection rate increases more than 10%, while maintaining an even
lower false positive rate. This observation implies that the improvement of the
detection performance is indeed proportional to our newly designed features
rather than the combination of several existing features.
Table IV. Comparison Without and With New Features
Without Our Features With Our Features
Algorithm FPR Detection Rate F-Score FPR Detection Rate F-Score
Decorate 0.017 0.738 0.774 0.010 0.858 0.877
Random Forest 0.012 0.728 0.786 0.006 0.836 0.884
Decision Tree 0.015 0.702 0.757 0.011 0.846 0.866
BayesNet 0.040 0.356 0.730 0.023 0.784 0.777
Next, each of the features are evaluated individually using the Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. This experiment uses a decision stump
based on 1 feature and varies the threshold for classification. Figure 7 shows a
graph for each feature type containing the ROC curves for each feature. No-
tice that the best performing features are the profile features and the content
features. The neighbor features perform the worst. However, the purpose of
the newly designed features is not to detect spammers better in general but to
detect evasive spammers.
The next experiment shows how effectively the features distinguish evasive
spammers from normal users. To do this a data set consisting of spammers that
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(a) Profile Features (b) Content Features
(c) Graph Features (d) Neighbor Features
(e) Automation Features (f) Timing Features
Fig. 7. Individual Feature ROC Curves
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Table V. Feature Rank
Feature Chi Square Info Gain AUC
number of followings 13 10 8
fofo ratio 8 9 15
number of tweets 7 7 10
account age 9 8 7
URL ratio 5 3 2
unique URL ratio 6 5 1
tweet similarity 11 12 9
bi-directional links ratio 12 15 12
betweenness centrality 18 18 17
clustering coefficient 10 14 6
average neighbors’ followers 16 16 13
average neighbors’ tweets 3 4 5
followings to median neighbors’ followers 17 17 16
following rate 14 11 18
tweet rate 4 6 11
API ratio 1 1 3
API URL ratio 2 2 4
API tweet similarity 15 13 14
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were misclassified by at least one of the previous algorithms and normal users
is used. Table V shows the rank of each of the features based on three feature
selection techniques: Chi Square, Information Gain and area under the ROC
curve (AUC). Notice that while the neighbor-based features did not perform well
in the previous experiment, average neighbors’ tweets is ranked highly according
to each feature selection technique. Also, while the best features in the previous
experiment were profile-based and content-based features, here the best features
are automation-based features. This shows that the new features are able to
classify the evasive spammers better than the features used in previous works.
4. Learning Curve
This section presents an experiment to show the steadiness of the new detection
scheme with varying amounts of training data. In order to show this, the ratio
of training data to testing data is varied and classifcation results are obtained.
Figure 8 shows the results. The detection rate increases slightly with more
training data, however, even with a small amount of training data it never drops
below 80%, still better than the best previous work. Accuracy increases more
drastically, indicating that more normal users are being misclassified. Also, the
false positive rate never climbs above 2%, even with equal amounts of training
and testing data.
B. Real World Evaluation
In this section, the new detection scheme is evaluted on a separate data set
containing 3,500 unclassified Twitter accounts. This experiment is a real world
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(a) False Positive (b) Detection Rate (c) Accuracy
Fig. 8. Effect of Varying the Training Ratio
evaluation of the new detection scheme, since no accounts have been pre-labeled.
The classifier is first trained using Dataset I, then the unclassified instances in
Dataset II are classified using the BayesNet classifier. Those users labeled as
spammers are then manually analyzed to determine the quality of the results.
The results of this analysis are shown in Table VI.
The classifier identified 70 accounts as spam accounts. After analyzing
the URLs that these accounts posted, GSB found 17 of them posted malicious
URLs in their tweets. This does not mean that the rest are innocent users, they
simply are using URLs that have yet to be identified by GSB. Through manual
analysis over half of reported spammers were actually verified as spam accounts.
However, the rest of the accounts were not ordinary Twitter accounts. In fact,
25 of the users were identified as advertisers. These are legitimate accounts
Table VI. Classifier Effectiveness
Total Spammer Predictions 70
Verified as Spammers 37
Promotional Advertisers 25
Identified by GSB 17
Benign 8
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that are advertising a legitimate business on Twitter. Many advertisers behave
similarly to spammers, which makes it difficult for an automatic classifier to
distinguish between the two.
These results show that the new detection scheme has a high Bayesian de-
tection rate at 88.6% (62/70). The 8 benign Twitter accounts that were labeled
as spam were investigated to determine the reason for their misclassification.
This analysis shows that all of them have odd behavior, typical of Twitter spam-
mers, but do not appear to have malicious intentions. Specifically, 6 of these
are actively tweeting about a particular topic (i.e. skateboarding) and thus
have similar tweets and post URLs often. The other 2 have posted very few
tweets, yet have a large number of followers and followees with a high follow-
ing follower ratio. The number of accounts classified as normal is too large for
manual investigation to determine false negative rate. However, in these types
of spam detection systems, the important factor is the false positive rate. This
is because it is better to not suspend a spammer than it is to suspend a normal
user since being wrongly suspended may irritate a normal user more than spam.
For this reason, the analysis focuses on those users that were identified as spam
instead of those identified as normal.
In practical situations, a major concern is the length of time it takes to
classify users because there are many users in an actual OSN. This is the reason
that the machine learning technique is popular, because most machine learning
classifiers are able to classify instances quickly, even if it takes more time to
train the classifier. To confirm this the training and classifying time for data
set II was recorded. The training time was 10.81s and the classification took so
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little time the Unix time function recorded 0.00s. The relatively long training
time is not a concern because the training time does not scale with the number
of instances to classify.
This chapter showed that the new detection scheme was able to out per-
form the existing schemes in all metrics. Also, the new detection scheme proved
effective at identifying spammers in an unclassified data set. Also, the tribula-
tions of detecting spam in an environment where advertising is prevalent were
discussed.
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CHAPTER IX
LIMITATION AND FUTURE WORK
Due to the practical limitations, the dataset includes only a portion of the data
on Twitter. Also, despite attempts to reduce the sampling bias and the use of
two separate data sets, the data may still be slightly biased. However, collecting
an ideal large data set from a real, dynamic OSN such as Twitter with neither
any errors nor any bias is difficult if not impossible.
As described in Chapter IV, it is also challenging to achieve comprehensive
ground truth for the Twitter spammers. The collected spammers belong to one
major type of spammers so that the number of collected Twitter spammers is
a lower bound of the number of real spammers in the data set. However, even
for a subset of real spammers, this work shows that they have utilized different
tactics to evade existing detection techniques. Also, the evaluation results on
these spammers have shown that the newly designed features can be used as
an effective supplement to existing detection features to detect evasive Twitter
spammers.
While graph-based features such as local clustering coefficient and between-
ness centrality are relatively difficult to evade, these features are also expensive
to extract. Thus, a sampling technique is used to calculate these metrics, which
may decrease the accuracy of the values of these features. Also, since the time
when an account follows another one is not available, an approximation is used
to calculate the following rate. For one thing, even this feature may be not
perfectly accurate, but an approximate value of this feature can still reflect how
radically an account is trying to increase its following number.
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Despite these limitations this work presents the first analysis of the evasion
tactics being used in OSNs. This work lays a foundation for future works to
discover and investigate new evasion tactics as they reveal themselves. For
future work, to overcome these limitations, better crawling strategies must be
designed and larger, more comprehensive data sets must be used. Also, as
spammers continue to evolve their evasion tactics, more robust features will
need to be developed. Since this work focuses on malicious spammers, the
evasion tactics of other types of spammers should be studied.
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CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION
In this paper, new robust features are designed to detect evasive Twitter spam-
mers through an in-depth analysis of the evasion tactics utilized by current
Twitter spammers. This work provides the first detailed analysis on how spam-
mers can evade existing detection features. Also, the detection rate of three
state-of-the-art solutions are examined which show that some Twitter spam-
mers have indeed evolved to evade detection. Then, according to that analysis,
several new features are designed and the effectiveness of these features is shown
through the evaluation experiments. Also, a novel formalization of the robust-
ness of a detection feature is designed and all features used by this work and
existing works are measured agains that formalization.
This work shows that while there is a lot of work being done on spam
detection in OSNs, the spammers are also working hard to avoid this detection.
As the arms race continues, more works like this will be required to keep up with
the evolving OSN spammers. In order to acheive effective results, researchers
and OSNs need to work together to design OSN features that make it easier to
distinguish a spammer from a normal user.
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